TCDS Bulletin - SPRING 2009 Issue (Vol. 18/3, Issue 56)
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The Battle with Georgia: A War with the West?
By ZURAB TCHIABERASHVILI
In August 2008, for the first time since the Soviet Union broke apart, the Kremlin,
reinforced by the high price of oil and gas, conducted a well-planned military operation
beyond its internationally recognized borders and intervened into neighboring Georgia
under the pretext of defending a tiny ethnic minority and its own “peacekeepers.” If
anybody had previously had difficulty believing Georgian claims about the true intentions
of the Russian Federation, the events of that month—the recognition of the
“independence” of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the stationing
there of military forces in contradiction of international law, and the pursuit of a policy of
annexation of those regions—made them clear to the world. Violating the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of a small country, Moscow was trying to redesign and redefine
existing security arrangements in Europe.
More is at stake than Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity alone. Moscow could
go further by destabilizing Ukraine, the main transit country for Russian energy to reach
the European market. Since 2000, 2.9 million Ukrainians have been “granted” Russian
citizenship. This is exactly what Russia did with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, namely,
establish “legal” grounds for economic, political, and even military intervention.
But forcing Kiev’s surrender under increased pressure is not the final and ultimate goal
either. The Kremlin is pursuing an idea of “spheres of influence” and “the near abroad”
as it tries to bring the Baltic states back under its influence. It is attempting to recapture
economic and political control over the Baltic Sea and to make NATO a “paper tiger” by
showing the world that even Article 5 of the treaty does not guarantee the security and
stability of its new (and perhaps even its old) members.
Nobody has illusions anymore about Russia’s real intentions. Therefore, the issue at hand
is not Russia’s behavior or the Georgian or Ukrainian response. It is what the West must
do in this situation. It would be dangerous to go back to a policy of business as usual. If
the Kremlin gets the message now that it can violate fundamental principles of the
existing international order without any consequences, its temptation to go further—for
example, destabilizing Ukraine—will increase.
There are some who see cooperation in nuclear disarmament and more effective handling
of the Iran issue as a basis for, and not a result of, a credible relationship between the
West and Russia—a fallacy on which Moscow will try to capitalize. If “a strategic
partnership” with Russia were possible—by abandoning Georgia’s or Ukraine’s vital
interests, as these persons might imply—then why, for example, is a crucial American
military base in Kyrgyzstan that supplies forces in nearby Afghanistan being closed at
Moscow’s apparent urging just as the new American administration has announced its
determination to move more resources into Afghanistan?
The fact is that those in Moscow who declare the dissolution of the Soviet Union “the
most tragic event of the twentieth century” cannot live with and in a world where there are
no Russian monopolies on energy supplies and no “zones of influence.” In addition,
Georgia disturbs them because it proves that a former Soviet republic’s transition from a
one-party system to a pluralistic democracy is not merely an aspiration but an achievable
goal. This is why the Kremlin’s ambition to conquer Georgia—not only part of it—
remains very much alive.
In a referendum in January 2008, more than 70% of Georgians supported the idea of
Georgia’s membership in NATO. They do not want that membership in order to bring
about a new confrontation with Russia but, on the contrary, to avoid one. Russia’s policy
of aggression turns them to Brussels to seek solid guarantees for security and stability.
Zurab Tchiaberashvili has been a TCDS Visiting Scholar and is currently serving as
Permanent Representative of Georgia to the Council of Europe.